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By the nineteenth century, modern codification movements had marked an 
apogee in the emergence of the post-Enlightenment, “Napoleonic” State.  If Europe 
had once been a heap of rival, parochial backwaters, codification would issue from a 
unified, centralized legislature.  If law had once languished in the randomness of 
custom and tradition, codification promised the rigour of system and logic.  
Strictly speaking, codification means taking a corpus of existing law in order 
merely to re-state it in some orderly fashion. But if the aim is to overcome inherited 
gaps and inconsistencies, then codification entails more. It requires selection of the 
best norms. What counts as “best” then depends on the legislators’ broader aims. Do 
they seek economic competitiveness? Or distributive justice? Or respect for 
fundamental rights? Or clarity and ease of implementation?  
The gaps and inconsistencies which the legislators seek to remedy do not 
necessarily result from sheer oversight. They may reflect rival social interests. 
Construed as the end product of a legislative act, a code might seek to reconcile those 
opposed factions through processes of interest-group bargaining – “horse trading”. On 
that model, rival voices would all hash out their differences within the political arena, 
with experts and legislators then steadily progressing towards an optimal text. One 
problem, however, is that not all voices will be equally loud in that arena, nor equally 
welcome. Outright policy choices will be made, even heavy-handedly imposed.  
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Controversies around the European Commission’s attempt to codify European 
Union (hereinafter: EU) private law now usher the codification saga into the twenty-
first century. Much EU scholarship has focused on the adoption of the Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (hereinafter: DCFR) or its shortened version, the Optional Sales 
Law Code (CELS). In The Struggle for European Private Law, Leone Niglia launches 
a searching critique that revisits the very notion of codification’s distinctly legislative 
paradigm. That model is, on his view, fundamentally flawed. The true function of a 
code goes missing. In order to grasp the full effects of codification, and to 
comprehend the purpose and function of some final text, we must, Niglia argues, shift 
our attention away from that legislative paradigm, towards what he identifies as a 
jurisprudential model. Codification becomes comprehensible, he suggests, only 
through an analysis – neglected in the existing literature – of jurisprudential actors 
within the process, such as judges and scholars.  
Codes are hybrids, then, of both legislative and jurisprudential forces. They 
“have no inherent truth when divorced from the jurisprudential forces that surround 
them”. (p. 2) Modern codification is instead “nomothetic”. It certainly encompasses 
thesis, legislation as such. But it also presupposes nomos, the broader values and 
principles often integrated within the distinctly juridical framework of scholars and 
judges (p. 3). Any critique of codification must examine those jurisprudential forces 
which mobilize either to promote codification, which Niglia correlates to 
individualism, or to limit codification, which he correlates to “the social”. Continuing 
his previous theoretical work, Niglia probes beyond the confines of DCFR within EU 
law. He examines codification within its broader historical context, while including 
elements of private law, as well as legal, political and social theory.  
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Niglia begins, in Chapter One, by distancing his approach from the ideal of the 
“complete and self-standing” text, inherited from a history of private law codification.  
The DCFR, he fears, would represent a “first step towards implementing a grander 
codification design for the whole of Europe” (p.8). Such a code would claim to 
embody rules and principles common throughout Europe – the “argument from 
commonality”. In fact, it emerges more as a strategic assemblage of such materials, 
developed through various techniques (p. 10). The DCFR displays two techniques: the 
first is systematisation, whereby the code becomes structured through given notions 
and categories; the second is coherence, whereby the code emerges, ideally, free of 
gaps, ambiguities, or inconsistencies. A third technique, identifiable in other 
codification regimes, is neutrality, whereby none of the competing interests covered 
by the code are allowed to dominate. Tellingly, for Niglia, the Commission abandons 
that third element.  
Niglia describes the Commission’s approach as “low intensity formalism”, 
achieved by the writing of model rules incorporating certain acquis and adding 
selected principles to such model rules. For example, the incorporation of provisions 
governing “Unfair Terms” into the Code demonstrates how the amalgamation of 
acquis and model rules strays from any ideal of neutrality. The Commission in fact 
reformulates the model rules included in the Code to promote market liberalization, 
through deregulation and competitiveness.  
That attempt is complemented by the introduction of carefully selected 
principles. Principles promoting the Commission agenda for market libertarianism 
such as efficiency and freedom are included, whereas rival principles of social 
responsibility and human rights are ignored. Insistence on such principles is 
reminiscent of EU austerity policies, which favor principles of market efficiency, such 
Heinze and Marcou, Review of Niglia, 25/09/2015 20:20:54, Page | 4 
as those included in the DCFR, over other social principles that might otherwise have 
been the focus of private law over the second half of the past century, that is, the 
period during which, according to Niglia, private law emphazised social principles. 
Codes historically aim at universality, imposing discipline over a fragmented 
yet “living” law. Codification inevitably places a stamp, a clearer – but, some might 
say, ideologically-driven – direction on law, as opposed to just neutrally distilling it. 
The Commission likewise uses the language of universality. The Code is supposedly 
general and neutral, refraining from partisan interests, and placing the argument from 
commonality at the center of any discussion. Niglia condemns that self-fashioning as 
hypocrisy. The reader may certainly join Niglia in rejecting that free market shift 
outright, although the Commission’s defenders might view it more as “reflecting” law 
and less as “making” law than he suggests. Today’s global markets signal, after all, a 
world quite different from that in which EU norms and institutions were first born. 
 Niglia invites even readers acquiescent in the Commission’s liberalizing drift, 
however, to question the terms of EU codification processes. To what extent does 
codification solely reflect and synthesize the laws and policies of member States, and 
to what extent does it actively, ideologically, mould that law? 
The Commission’s work, on Niglia’s view, risks shifting legal reasoning from 
the dual platform of parallel national and European levels to a purely code-orientated, 
monist approach, which would supersede non-code based interpretations and would 
prioritise textual approaches. The plural and fragmented nature of current 
jurisprudence ends up sacrificed at the altar of centralized private law. The DCFR 
then constitutes “a legislative attempt to chain nomos to thesis by conjuring up a 
code-text with an overarching ideological plan at its core” (p. 5). 
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 Niglia suggests in Chapter 2 that European jurisprudence has strayed from the 
nineteenth century aspirations. This has culminated, in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, in a period of “jurisprudential de-codification” (p. 61). From the nineteenth 
century onwards, private law has pluralized, performing the overtly political role of 
accommodating conflicting social interests. In the same way, Niglia maintains, a 
unique European jurisprudence has developed, which the codification movement now 
jeopardizes.  
 Current European jurisprudence traces both to the EU Directive regime and to 
the re-creation of legal traditions domestically through the impact of the decisions of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. Courts and scholars take an active role in 
balancing “individualist European values and social private law”. With the new 
century, courts have pursued a more active approach. They “actively engage in 
making new value choices by employing techniques of constitutional adjudication” 
(pp. 65-66). A European jurisprudence has arisen within private law based on the 
balancing and the facilitation of conflicts and of conflicting social interests. 
 Pragmatists will retort that there is always tension between the domestic and 
European systems, leaving limited space for a unified European jurisprudence. How 
much consistency we could ever really find across such divergent national systems 
remains debatable. Faced with economic competitors like the United States, Japan, 
China, India, and any number of emerging powers, the question once again arises as 
to whether we seek to repudiate codification altogether, or whether we simply seek 
greater candor about which values it promotes and which it neglects.  
 Having outlined the nature and function of the Code in Chapter One and the 
state of jurisprudence in Chapter Two, Niglia then examines how the two interact. 
European jurisprudence, he argues in Chapter Three, rejects the move for codification. 
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The Commission’s desire to impose the Code stands as an assault on the current 
European reality. The Commission endeavors to “replace the heritage of material 
rights by a neo-classical, formal set of right channelling the strategy of market 
libertarianism” (p. 80). The Code would risk altering current jurisprudence to a 
jurisprudence which only allows for interpretations based on a Code-regime.  
Niglia joins other scholars in warning against the substitution of national 
mandatory rules by the Code’s supranational mandatory rules. Mandatory rules are 
unique features of domestic jurisdictions. Their replacement would lead to a “social 
dumping”, the lowering of standards that had protected the weaker contracting parties. 
That damage would mirror “constitutional dumping”. The imposition of 
individualistic rules and principles through the Code would taint the more balanced 
structures of domestic private law. 
A similar impact would occur in the case of background “default” rules, which 
“the law provides as a benchmark that the parties may adhere to or dispose of as they 
wish, and which would liberate the courts from having to decide which obligations are 
reasonable and which are not as a whole and not selectively” (p. 95). Privately, 
contracting parties will bargain in the shadow of default rules, which merely serve to 
fill in gaps after the contract is concluded. Default rules apply to all contracts, but the 
parties maintain the prerogative to contract around them if they so wish.  
Under the Code, it is the Code’s own default rules which then prevail. To say 
it otherwise, as the Code would form the only point of reference, judges, “if … 
minded to enforce reasonable obligations as provided for in domestic default 
rules” (at p. 95), would face the substantial interpretative hurdle of having to bypass 
the Code’s own default rules. Codification would run contrary to the living 
jurisprudence and to the current methods of juridical reasoning. In this context, 
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current practices of constitutional balancing may find themselves eclipsed by black-
letter or “grammatical” interpretation, comprising the Code’s limited “range of 
artificial, technocratic norms” (p. 105). As a result, the Code, which incorporates an 
artificial world of partisan values, would replace the plurality of values characteristic 
of contemporary private law.  
On a more-or-less standard model, codification represents a struggle between 
rival forces. Niglia depicts these as the political institutions of the EU favoring the 
codification of private law versus a jurisprudential model, which seeks to protect and 
perpetuate the current “living law”. In Chapter 4, he points to a further struggle within 
the jurisprudential model. Niglia argues that jurisprudential forces may produce the 
legal material which fuels the codification project, but which remains in tension with 
forces that can subvert that project.   
Jurisprudential forces are not in fact unified and harmoniously interacting. 
They are dynamic and can conflict. On one hand, strands of jurisprudence 
conceptualize private law through the models of systematization, coherence, and 
neutralism, positing codification as an “obvious final step” (p. 149). Other strands of 
jurisprudence have been developed through the pluralization and fragmentation of 
private law. They are committed to the synthesis of conflicts as affected through the 
Directives regime and the subsequent interaction of national and European law. In this 
context, an individualist vocabulary becomes balanced and merges with the social 
vocabulary emanating from private law as made nationally.  
For Niglia, a decisionist movement alone on the part of political agents 
generates no adequate code, because the jurisprudential climate needs to 
accommodate the move. Several scholars revert to the aforementioned three 
techniques characteristic of the codification era. Systematization promotes an 
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interpretative climate favoring abstract individualistic rights over social rights (pp. 
118-121). These scholars return to past forms of reasoning by proponents of the 
codification movement. In domestic jurisprudence the trend is to portray private law 
as “inherently a-political and a-constitutional” (p. 125) and therefore in strong need of 
systematization. Jurisprudence, Niglia warns, must examine Codes as constitutions 
promoting a substantive agenda. He urges scholars to look past the claims of the 
Commission about the Code’s neutrality and universality and to examine the 
economic and political agenda driving the codification project. 
Niglia’s critique of codification of the private law swings to a pole opposite to 
the desire to codify based on the argument that private law is a-political and a-
constitutional. The two poles are not, however, mutually exclusive, as Niglia 
recognizes (Preface). A code can recognize, respect, and even enforce the 
constitutionality of private law. The risk that a code would reduce private law to an 
array of technocratic norms, devoid of any social, political or constitutional effect, is 
real, though not inevitable. Even if we suspect a partisan position driving the 
Commission, it does not necessarily mean that the codification project would rob 
private law of its constitutional character. Bearing in mind that at stake is a 
supranational code, the question arises as to whether a code could be drafted to 
respect the plurality of legal systems through the solidification of parts of private law 
and the allowance for flexibility for other parts. Niglia acknowledges these tensions in 
Chapter Four (in particular at Part D).  
Niglia rejects conventional rationalist interpretations of codification projects, 
which see codes as instruments employed to reinforce State sovereignty, or to boost a 
nationalist agenda. He treats the DCFR as a regulatory tool, concentrating on 
economic regulations via administrative processes. He presents the DCFR as an 
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attempt to entrench an economic constitution. In implementing an economic plan, the 
code becomes a law which can “channel, facilitate, steer and reinforce social practices 
regarding market relations” (p. 137). Still, the analogy between domestic 
jurisprudence and its effect on domestic codes and European jurisprudence and its 
effect on a pan-European code raises further questions. Jurisprudence in each member 
State is uniquely established, in comparison with any European jurisprudence. The 
impact of national jurisprudence is indeed affected by the jurisprudence of each State. 
But does European jurisprudence affect a European Code in the same way? Because 
European jurisprudence is not unified nor always consistent, it may exert less impact 
on a political decision to codify private law. 
The critique of a European Code might certainly be damning if it were 
supported through historical or social evidence as to the failures of another 
supranational code of similar character. In the absence of such precedent, Niglia 
draws from national codes. But does historical experience from domestic codified 
texts bear the same resemblance to a pan-European code? Would a supranational code 
behave in an identical manner to national codes? Even though a European code could 
demonstrate some of the features of national codes and codes in general, it does not 
necessarily mean that it would operate in an identical manner.  
National codes, rooted in an established and determined national 
jurisprudence, can, moreover, readily assimilate rules, principles, and procedures 
within the domestic legal system. European Codification seeks, by contrast, to collect 
rules from European and domestic law. There is no established or precise legal system 
from which to derive material (for the directives may, on crucial points, prove 
indeterminate). The analogy between domestic codes and the application of the results 
to a supranational code may not, then, extend as far as the literature on the project of 
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European private law codification suggests. Absent another supranational code to 
supply any comparison, however, Niglia’s approach certainly draws our attention to 
core concerns and contradictions within the ongoing European project. In his 
Epilogue, Niglia concedes the limits of historical evidence drawn from national 
systems (p. 156). His discussion of national codes seems more relevant when the EU 
behaves like a single State, though possibly less so when the two are dissimilar. He 
nonetheless directs the reader’s attention to the interpretation whereby the EU may be 
considered to resemble a large State entity, making the analogy to national regimes 
germane.  
Niglia expresses cogent concern about the Commission attempts to establish a 
Code in the field of private law. These would have an impact on a codified text on 
European jurisprudence; and as such impact has been developing in the era of 
Directives, this is serious indeed. Codification would have a deep constitutional 
impact on the structures of private law and on the jurisprudence on the field. The 
strong critique of codification expressed in the book is certainly a consideration of 
vital importance. Niglia’s critique emanates from a close examination of codification 
in a manner revealing its complexity and the various constitutional and legal issues 
that are involved. Engaging with several fields Niglia succeeds in offering a 
convincing argument for a shift in our outlook on codification projects at the 
European level. Codification projects are assuredly more complex than they may be 
perceived to be.  
 Niglia’s proposal to turn to jurisprudential forces to examine the codification 
project is not merely enlightening but imperative. He raises awareness about the state 
of European private law and also achieves two aims. First, he sheds light on the role 
of the European Commission and its motives within the codification project. Second, 
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he emphasizes the power of jurisprudential forces to condone or condemn the Code. 
This force of this observation is stressed in Niglia’s comment that the mere creation of 
the Code is insufficient, because the codified text needs to command authority. The 
role of jurisprudence is vital, as a code may command weak authority if dominant 
interpretations diminish the Code’s value.  
The problems Niglia identifies are not transient. They go to the heart of the 
EU project and of the European future. Niglia’s critique throws down a gauntlet that 
conscientious scholars and policymakers will need to pick up, indeed for some time to 
come.  
 
